The wider context was unmistakable.

On 16 July 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 16, outlining provisional plans for Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain.

Yet no landing could be contemplated until the Luftwaffe had secured air superiority.

The RAF’s destruction was paramount—not only to prevent it from striking the invasion fleet, but also to deny cover to the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet, which posed the greatest threat to any attempted crossing.

On 1 August, Göring received Directive No. 17, authorising an all-out assault on British air and sea power.

On 10 May 1940, the German offensive—Unternehmen Gelb (Operation Yellow), also known as the Manstein Plan—was unleashed.

This bold and rapid campaign shattered Allied defences.

The Battle of France ended in catastrophe for the Allies: the main French Army was destroyed, while the British Expeditionary Force narrowly escaped through Dunkirk.

Paris fell on 14 June, and within weeks German forces had swept across much of the country.

On 25 June 1940, France formally surrendered, leaving Britain standing alone against Hitler’s war machine.

The Luftwaffe was tasked with destroying the RAF, while the Kriegsmarine was ordered to prepare the transport of German forces across the Channel. 

Göring promised swift victory from the skies. If the RAF could be crushed, Hitler believed invasion might not even be necessary.

This aerial offensive was codenamed Adlerangriff - Operation Eagle Attack—the campaign that would lead directly into the Battle of Britain.

That opening phase, known as the Kanalkampf - the Channel battle - began on 10 July and ran through to 8 August 1940.

It did not initially focus on RAF airfields deep inland, but instead sought to provoke Fighter Command into combat by attacking British Channel convoys.

The logic was straightforward: by drawing the RAF into repeated defensive battles over the Channel, the Luftwaffe hoped to wear down its pilots and aircraft before launching a decisive strike.

The second phase of German attacks unfolded between 8 and 18 August.

Shipping remained a target, but now coastal airfields, radar stations, and positions south of London were brought under attack, with raids also reaching as far north as Liverpool under cover of darkness.

On 12 August, the Luftwaffe mounted its first major inland strikes.

RAF stations at Hawkinge, Lympne, and Manston, along with radar stations at Pevensey, Rye, and Dover, were all marked for destruction.

Portsmouth docks were also bombed.

By 12 August, despite these frustrations, the Luftwaffe believed it was achieving significant results against Fighter Command.

Preparations were finalised for an all-out assault—the operation known as Adlertag, or Eagle Day. German air strength had recovered sufficiently: 71 percent of bombers, 85 percent of Bf 109 units, and 83 percent of Bf 110 units were operational.

With confidence high, the Luftwaffe prepared to launch the next and most ambitious stage of the battle.

At the core of German misjudgement stood Joseph “Beppo” Schmid, commander of the Luftwaffe’s Military Intelligence Branch, Abteilung 5.

His reports throughout this period were riddled with errors.

In July 1940, Schmid both exaggerated the Luftwaffe’s own strength and underestimated the capacity of the RAF.

His most dangerous mistakes concerned radar, airfield identification, and British aircraft production.

Schmid confidently asserted that southern England possessed only a handful of operational airfields.

He claimed Britain could build merely 180–330 fighters per month and predicted that production would soon decline, leaving the RAF unable to withstand a prolonged battle of attrition.

The truth was very different: in July 1940 British factories produced 496 fighters.

On Adlertag itself, many of the designated targets, even if destroyed, would have done little to weaken Britain’s fighter defence.

Thus, the Luftwaffe’s grand offensive began from a foundation built on flawed intelligence.

The errors of Schmid and his branch meant that Adlertag’s blows fell wide of the mark, allowing the RAF to fight on with undiminished strength.

By integrating this revolutionary technology with the keen eyes of the Royal Observer Corps and a meticulous system of information processing,

Dowding created a mechanism that allowed Britain to intercept and respond to incoming German attacks with remarkable speed and efficiency.

The system’s official title - RDF, or Radio Direction Finding - was itself a deliberate act of deception, designed to conceal its true purpose from German intelligence should its existence ever be revealed.

Inside this nerve centre, teams from the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) converted streams of incoming reports into a visual picture of the battle in motion.

Using telephones, they relayed details of enemy positions, then placed colour-coded counters onto a vast map of Britain, spread across a plotting table marked with a British Modified Grid.

Magnetic rakes pushed these counters across the surface, tracking each raid’s direction, altitude, and strength.

The colour of a counter indicated how recent the information was, ensuring that commanders could instantly judge whether they were working with fresh intelligence or older, less reliable data.

At the same time as the central plot at Bentley Priory, identical streams of information were transmitted to the Group headquarters, where control was exercised at a tactical level.

Each Group operated its own filter room, where data was cross-checked before being passed into their operations room, also housed within fortified underground bunkers.

Here, the map on the plotting table covered the Group’s specific area of responsibility, showing its airfields, bases, and patrol sectors.

Lines of radio and telephone links carried a constant flow of reports to and from Observer Corps posts, naval stations, anti-aircraft batteries, and the sector airfields themselves.

Adlertag itself began in confusion. Poor weather forced a postponement, but the recall orders failed to reach all units.

At dawn, Dorniers of KG 2 bombed Eastchurch unescorted, devastating hangars, stores, and aircraft—but Eastchurch was a Coastal Command base, not part of Fighter Command.

On their return, the Dorniers were mauled by Hurricanes and Spitfires, losing five aircraft.

Other early raids against Farnborough and Odiham achieved little, with German crews greatly exaggerating their success.

While the Luftwaffe pressed its daylight offensive, RAF Bomber Command suffered disaster.

Twelve Blenheims sent against Aalborg in Denmark lost eleven aircraft, with only one returning - a bitter blow that darkened the RAF’s own tally for the day.

As night fell, German operations shifted to psychological warfare.

Nine He 111s of Kampfgruppe 100 attempted to bomb the Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich, but only four crews found the target, causing minor damage.

Other raids struck Belfast, Glasgow, and cities across Britain, destroying five Short Stirlings at Queen’s Island but achieving little else.

Propaganda leaflets, parachutes, and radios were dropped over the Midlands and Scotland to suggest an imminent invasion.

Scattered raids stretched civil defences, but physical damage was limited.

In the afternoon, Do 17s struck Pevensey radar station, achieving temporary disruption.

Further raids targeted Middle Wallop, hit four times between 17:07 and 19:35, killing three airmen and a civilian.

Spitfires of No. 609 Squadron intercepted, downing a Ju 88 and a He 111, the latter carrying Oberst Alois Stöckl, Kommodore of KG 55. RAF Andover also suffered, while Southampton’s rail network was disrupted.

The day opened at 04:50 when a Dornier Do 17, sent to photograph southern airfields, was intercepted south of Ventnor by Spitfires of No. 152 Squadron.

It was shot down before completing its task—an omen of the battles to come.

At mid-morning, forty-five Ju 87 Stukas, escorted by JG 26 fighters, dived on Hawkinge and Lympne. Hurricanes of No. 501 Squadron and Spitfires of No. 54 Squadron intercepted, downing several attackers, yet the bombers pressed through.

Lympne was wrecked—buildings destroyed, power and telephone lines cut, the station unusable for forty-eight hours.

Hawkinge was hit but quickly recovered. Radar coverage briefly faltered as power lines to Rye, Dover, and Foreness stations were severed.

At 13:30, fifty Ju 88s of KG 30 bombed RAF Driffield despite interceptions by Hurricanes, Spitfires, and Defiants.

Four hangars and three buildings were destroyed, seven Whitleys lost, six RAF personnel killed. Anti-aircraft fire and fighters downed six of the bombers.

An hour later, eighty-eight Do 17s of KG 3, heavily escorted, crossed from Belgium. Despite fierce resistance, many broke through.

The Short Brothers factory at Rochester was hit hard - six Stirling bombers destroyed, production halted.

At Martlesham Heath, Bf 110s of Erprobungsgruppe 210 struck low, demolishing workshops and hangars.

Scattered raids continued into the night, reaching as far as Liverpool and Birmingham, but with little effect.

The true battle had been fought in daylight.

By nightfall, the Luftwaffe had suffered its heaviest losses of the campaign so far.

The RAF’s southern airfields were battered but operational; radar remained intact.

In the north, Luftflotte 5’s defeat was decisive. Göring’s grand plan to crush Fighter Command in a single coordinated blow had failed.

The skies over Kent erupted as RAF fighters clashed with bombers and their escorts. Ten German aircraft were downed, but six RAF fighters were lost. Hauptmann Walter Oesau of JG 51 claimed two Spitfires, raising his tally to eighteen.

On the ground, West Malling was bombed again, forcing its closure until 20 August.

Civilian casualties mounted: Tilbury docks were hit, and at Northfleet, Bowater’s Paper Mills suffered a direct strike—25 killed, 32 injured.

At 13:00, a new wave crossed from Cherbourg—150 aircraft including Ju 87 Stukas of StG 2, Ju 88s of KG 54, and heavy fighter escort.

Over Nab Tower, the formation split: Ventnor radar, Portsmouth, Gosport, and Tangmere were all targeted.

RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires engaged fiercely. Though RAF pilots claimed 17 Stukas, Luftwaffe records confirmed nine losses.

Evening raids continued. Heinkels struck Heathrow, Wimbledon, Essex, and Eastbourne. Farnborough and Harwell were bombed, and Brize Norton was hit again.

Manston was dive-bombed. By nightfall, scattered attacks reached Brough, Filton, Cardiff, and South Wales.

Fighter Command lost 23 aircraft and nine pilots.

The Luftwaffe lost 44 aircraft and 55 aircrew.

Churchill, observing from RAF Uxbridge, later immortalised the day with his words: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”

Fighter Command used the pause to regroup. Repairs resumed at Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, and Kenley.

Reinforcements arrived: No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron at Duxford, No. 1 (Canadian) Squadron joined the fight, and others redeployed to strengthen southern defences.

Luftwaffe activity was limited to scattered reconnaissance. Aircraft shadowed convoys along the East Coast and probed southern airfields.

A lone German plane dropped propaganda leaflets over Welshpool.

Another was downed by the Royal Navy in the Channel.

Despite claims by Luftwaffe aces—including Oesau, Tietzen, and Bär—RAF records show no fighter losses.

The first blood of the day was drawn in the pre-dawn hours.

A German Junkers Ju 88 from NJG 1 was intercepted and shot down by a British Bristol Blenheim night fighter, its three crewmen becoming the first casualties of a day destined for carnage.

As daylight broke, German reconnaissance intensified.

A Messerschmitt Bf 110 was shot down at an altitude of 31,000 feet by Spitfires from No. 66 Squadron, the first daylight loss for the Luftwaffe that day and the highest recorded interception of the campaign.

These probing flights, operating from 20,000 to 25,000 feet, were a systematic effort to test British defences and pinpoint targets for the day's main assaults, which were already forming up on airfields across northern France.

As Roth’s Dorniers swept in at treetop level, they were met by a hail of fire from No. 111 Squadron’s Hurricanes and ground defences.

Though they pressed home their attack, destroying three hangars and several aircraft on the ground, the cost was severe.

Five of the nine bombers were lost, and only one returned undamaged.

The attack claimed the life of Flight Lieutenant S.D.P. Connors of No. 111 Squadron, whose Hurricane was hit by anti-aircraft fire.

At 14:00, the Luftwaffe launched its most ambitious attack of the day, targeting coastal airfields and the Poling radar station.

The assault was led by over 100 vulnerable Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers.

They struck RAF Ford, RAF Thorney Island, and RNAS Gosport, inflicting significant damage to facilities and aircraft on the ground, with particularly heavy casualties at Ford.

Simultaneously, a group of Stukas attacked the Poling radar station, destroying two transmission pylons and knocking the site out of commission.

The Stukas’ lack of close fighter escort made them easy targets for the RAF.

Hurricanes from Nos. 43 and 601 Squadrons tore into the formations, shooting down ten of the 28 bombers from one group alone.

This brutal toll exposed the Ju 87’s vulnerability, and August 18, 1940, marked its last major appearance in a daylight raid over Britain.

Sunday, August 18, 1940, was the costliest day of the campaign for the Luftwaffe.

They failed to put any RAF sector station out of action, a clear sign of Fighter Command’s resilience.

The day marked a turning point, exposing the Ju 87’s weakness and the limits of the Luftwaffe’s ability to coordinate large, multi-phase assaults.

Fighter Command had endured its hardest day, taking a brutal pounding but remaining in the fight.

In a controversial move, Göring ordered the immediate withdrawal of the vulnerable Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers from frontline operations, a humiliating demotion for a weapon that had dominated earlier campaigns.

More controversially, he mandated that the agile Bf 109 fighters abandon their "free-hunting" tactics and act as close escorts for slower bomber streams, a decision that drew immediate scorn from the fighter pilots.

To improve leadership, Göring also purged older, less effective commanders, replacing them with a new generation of younger, more aggressive officers.

As night fell, the war entered a new phase.

Instead of mass raids, dozens of single German aircraft conducted uncoordinated attacks, dropping bombs randomly.

However, a technologically significant raid was conducted by KGr 100, which used the advanced X-Verfahren radio navigation system for a precision attack on the Bristol Aeroplane Company.

This marked a new, more precise era of night bombing and a clear shift in Luftwaffe strategy, proving that even a quiet day on the surface could be a turning point in the air war.

Despite the quiet, a few dramatic moments punctuated the day.

A sharp strike by Bf 110s from Erprobungsgruppe 210 on Martlesham Heath met with fierce resistance, and a Dornier Do 17 patrol over the North Sea was intercepted by No. 242 Squadron, costing the life of a young Hurricane pilot, Midshipman P.J. Patterson.

In a more bizarre event, a Focke-Wulf Condor on a reconnaissance mission crashed in neutral Ireland, becoming the first German airmen interned by Irish authorities.

The afternoon also saw a significant development over Kent, where a pilot named Leutnant Heinz Bär of JG 51 claimed his fifth aerial victory, earning the prestigious status of "ace."

British radar stations detected a formation of Dornier Do 17s approaching Norfolk, but No. 242 Squadron quickly engaged, breaking up the attack and forcing the bombers to seek refuge in the clouds.

Meanwhile, a coastal convoy in the Dover Straits came under sustained attack from both artillery and bombers, but a robust defensive screen of barrage balloons and anti-aircraft fire forced the Germans to jettison their bombs prematurely.

The most damaging raid of the day struck a Coastal Command airfield at RAF St. Eval in Cornwall. Junkers Ju 88s from KG 30 launched a brutal attack, destroying six Blenheims on the ground and setting hangars ablaze.

RAF fighters scrambled, but they arrived too late to prevent the destruction.

Later, a raid on Manston Airfield proved more successful for the Germans, who destroyed two hangars and rendered the airfield temporarily unserviceable.

During the attack, two British pilots were killed or wounded in intense dogfights.

Meanwhile, the newly formed No. 302 (Polish) Squadron flew its second combat mission, with its presence serving as a powerful symbol of Allied unity.

As the day wore on, a new and dangerous tactic emerged at sea. German Heinkel He 115 torpedo bombers sank two ships in the Moray Firth, demonstrating a new threat to Britain’s vital maritime supply lines.

When night fell, the war entered a new phase. German night raids, though not as widespread as the previous night, were more concentrated.

They struck industrial centers in Bristol and Birmingham, with bombs falling on docks, factories, and residential areas, causing widespread damage and casualties.

The day was costly for both sides. The RAF lost 20 aircraft and 10 pilots, while the Luftwaffe lost at least 41 aircraft.

While key airfields and cities suffered significant damage, the German toll was so heavy that it convinced Adolf Hitler to change his strategy.

Winston Churchill’s swift order for a retaliatory raid on Berlin sealed the course of events, transforming the conflict from a tactical air campaign into the full-scale Blitz.

The 24th August 1940, had demonstrated both the resilience of Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe's shift towards sustained terror bombing, but ultimately, the RAF remained bloodied but unbroken.

At 16:00, the first and largest assault began. Over 200 German aircraft swept across the Channel toward the southwest, their formations targeting the crucial RAF airfield at Warmwell, along with key naval assets at Weymouth and Portland.

The raid was spearheaded by Junkers Ju 88s from II./KG 51 and II./KG 54, protected by a formidable screen of Bf 110s and Bf 109s from units like JG 2 and JG 53.

Fighter Command scrambled every available squadron from 10 and 11 Groups, including Spitfires from Nos. 152 and 609 Squadrons, and Hurricanes from Nos. 87 and 213 Squadrons.

Later that evening, a second major raid over Kent and the Thames Estuary was met with similar ferocity, as the exhausted British pilots were forced into action once more.

As darkness fell, the Luftwaffe launched widespread night attacks on industrial centers across the country.

Heinkel He 111s from KG 55 struck Bristol, while others bombed Birmingham and Coventry, causing widespread damage and casualties.

The first major raid struck at mid-morning, with around 50 Dornier Do 17 bombers and up to 100 fighters attacking the Dover–Folkestone sector.

Fighter Command scrambled six squadrons to meet the threat, but the defence was costly. No. 616 Squadron was caught climbing into position and lost seven Spitfires in rapid succession, with two pilots killed.

The two-man Defiants of No. 264 Squadron were also decimated, losing three aircraft to the fighter escort, though their gunners claimed several bombers in return.

By 12:50, the raid had been broken up, with limited damage to ground targets.

The final major daylight operation fell to Luftflotte 3, with around 50 Heinkel He 111s escorted by over 100 fighters attacking Portsmouth and Southampton.

Many of the bombers were forced to jettison their ordnance into the Channel before reaching their targets, but Portsmouth was still badly hit.

Bombs struck the dockyard, damaging naval vessels like the destroyer HMS Acheron and the HMS Bulldog, and setting fire to a gasworks.

As darkness fell, this new, terrifying phase of the battle continued.

The Luftwaffe launched a sharp increase in night operations, with the heaviest traffic heading toward Birmingham and Coventry.

Widespread bombing occurred across Bristol, Plymouth, and other industrial cities, causing serious damage to factories, dockyards, and residential areas.

The BSA Small Arms Works at Smallheath in Birmingham sustained serious damage.

On the home front, reports of parachute landings triggered false Home Guard alerts, a sign of the widespread fear and paranoia.

The RAF scrambled to intercept, but the battle proved devastating for No. 264 Squadron, whose Defiant fighters were outmatched.

Three of their twelve aircraft were shot down, and five aircrew were killed.

The squadron was immediately withdrawn from daylight operations, a tragic lesson learned in the face of superior German fighters.

The Luftwaffe pressed on, leaving Eastchurch badly scarred and Rochford’s landing ground cratered.

The fierce morning saw the RAF lose eight fighters and six pilots, while five German aircraft were destroyed.

Among the German losses was Leutnant Arthur Dau, a seven-victory ace shot down and captured by Sergeant George Smythe.

The real fighting began in the afternoon.

A large force of nearly 170 aircraft headed toward Biggin Hill, sparking heavy combat over Kent. While RAF pilots claimed several victories, they suffered notable losses.

Pilots like Sergeant J.H. Mortimer Ellis and Sergeant F.R. Walker-Smith were shot down but managed to bail out and survive.

However, others were not so lucky.

In a later raid on Rochester, Flight Lieutenant Harry Raymond Hamilton, a Canadian pilot, was killed when his Hurricane was shot down.

At midday, a massive raid of over 300 German aircraft swept across the Kent coastline in three consecutive waves.

These formations broke up over southern England, striking vital RAF airfields and civilian targets.

Fighter Command responded by scrambling every available squadron, committing sixteen units to the desperate defense of Kent and Surrey.

In the swirling chaos of the dogfights, pilots on both sides were killed, but in a significant moment for the Allies, the newly formed No. 303 (Polish) Squadron saw its first combat and scored its inaugural kill.

As night fell, the Luftwaffe shifted to a widespread night offensive.

The industrial Midlands were a primary target, with raids hitting Bristol, Birmingham, and Liverpool.

The bombing also extended to London, where key radar stations were disabled, an attack that had significant operational consequences for Fighter Command.

The day’s toll was grim for both sides. The Luftwaffe flew over 1,300 sorties and lost 40 aircraft confirmed destroyed.

The RAF lost 25 aircraft and nine pilots, while civilian casualties mounted across the country.

Despite suffering heavy losses and severe damage to its critical infrastructure, Fighter Command remained operational and unbroken.

The German commanders had failed to achieve air superiority, and their costly raids had only steeled Britain’s resolve.