The morning of 10 July 1940 opened under driving rain that turned the Channel to dull metal — a fitting backdrop for the day that formally pushed the Kanalkampf into full, violent motion and marked the true opening phase of the Battle of Britain. Since France’s collapse, the narrow sea lane had become Britain’s exposed throat, and Göring had already tasked II. and VIII. Fliegerkorps with choking it. Johannes Fink of KG 2, appointed Kanalkampfführer, coordinated these escalating strikes, pairing Bf 110s as close escort with Bf 109s free to hunt RAF fighters — a tactical compromise that would define the early battle.
By mid‑morning Convoy CW 3, code‑named Bread, rounded North Foreland. A Dornier from 4.(F)/121, escorted by JG 51, sighted it through cloud and rain. British radar and observers tracked the incoming build‑up, and Park began committing squadrons. Shortly after 13:30 the first major clash erupted: twenty‑six Do 17s of KG 2, shielded by ZG 26’s Bf 110s and fighters of JG 3 and JG 51, collided with Hurricanes and Spitfires from 32, 56, 111 and 74 Squadrons. Confusion was instant and brutal. In one of the day’s cruellest moments, Flying Officer Peter Higgs’s Hurricane collided with a Dornier; both aircraft fell into the Channel, and Higgs became the first RAF fighter pilot killed in combat during the Battle of Britain.
Despite the ferocity, the convoy survived. Around 150 bombs fell but only a single sloop was confirmed sunk. German claims of heavy shipping losses and dozens of RAF fighters destroyed proved inflated; several Dorniers, Bf 110s and Bf 109s were lost, and RAF squadrons suffered their own casualties.
Elsewhere, early‑morning raids struck East Anglian airfields, and a lone Dornier of KG 3 was shot down off the East Coast by No. 66 Squadron. In the afternoon, Ju 88s from Luftflotte 3 hit Swansea and Falmouth, destroying factories, docks and shipping, with civilian casualties mounting.
By nightfall both sides had endured a punishing, inconclusive day. The convoys still sailed, German tactics had been bloodily tested, and Fighter Command’s system had shown its resilience. The Kanalkampf — and with it the Battle of Britain — had begun in earnest.
The morning of 10 July 1940 opened under a hard, damp sky. Rain driven in sheets across the English Channel turned the water to pewter; pilots and sailors called it “Harry Clampers.”
After the fall of France the narrow stretch of sea between the two shores had become a new front line. For weeks German aircraft had probed and tested British defences, but this day promised to be different: deliberate, concentrated and intended to force the Royal Air Force into a costly response.
The Luftwaffe’s objective was stark — strike Britain’s convoys, attrit its fighters, and make the sea lanes perilous enough to choke supplies.
For the Germans, the Channel was not merely water; it was the throat of Britain’s life supply.
...orchestrating concentrated attacks...
Operational orders had been laid down days earlier.
On 30 June Hermann Göring had delegated responsibility for attacking shipping to II.
Fliegerkorps under Bruno Loerzer and VIII. Fliegerkorps under Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen because those formations contained most of the Ju 87 Stuka units and other strike assets.
Geschwaderkommodore Johannes Fink, commander of KG 2, was appointed Kanalkampfführer — Channel Battle Leader — charged with orchestrating concentrated attacks on merchant convoys and their escorts.
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Fink faced a tactical problem: the Jagdwaffe’s Bf 109s were the finest single-engine fighters the Luftwaffe possessed, but tying them down to close bomber escort robbed them of freedom of manoeuvre.
Fink devised a compromise: the heavier Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstörergeschwader would provide close escort to the bombers while the Bf 109s roamed more freely, seeking RAF fighters at a tactical advantage.
The map tables along the French coast showed the routes of coastal convoys and the sectors from which the Luftwaffe would converge. Reconnaissance was continuous.
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A Do 17 of 4.(F)/121, sent to reconnoitre the Channel in thick cloud and rain, flew with a Staffel of Bf 109s from I./JG 51 and reported positions of vessels and weather to Kanalfront headquarters.
On the British side, radar plots and ground observers tracked the arriving formations; visual sightings were confirmed by ground observers; telephones and cables carried terse reports. Sector controllers readied their sectors and fighters were put on notice.
Squadron dispersals filled with ground crew and pilots checking guns, tightening harnesses and listening for orders.