Adlerangriff - The main attack
Adlertag - (“Eagle Day”) - marked the opening of Unternehmen Adlerangriff (“Operation Eagle Attack”), the Luftwaffe’s grand attempt to crush RAF Fighter Command and clear the way for an invasion of Britain.
This phase of the Battle of Britain lasted from 13th August to 6th September 1940
It came directly on the heels of Kanalkampf (10 July–12 August 1940), the earlier phase of the Battle of Britain in which German forces had probed the Channel convoys, tested British responses, and gathered intelligence.
Having bloodied Fighter Command and drawn its squadrons into battle over the sea lanes, Göring and his commanders believed the stage was set for a decisive blow.
A formation of Luftwaffe JU-88's over England. During Adlerangriff—the sustained assault beginning 13 August 1940—the Luftwaffe sought to annihilate RAF Fighter Command. Göring committed Luftflotten 2, 3, and 5 to coordinated strikes on airfields, radar, and aircraft factories. Waves of bombers, escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s, crossed the Channel daily in punishing raids. Though devastating in scale, with hundreds of sorties launched, the offensive overstretched German resources. Heavy losses, especially among bombers and Bf 110s, revealed the limits of the Luftwaffe’s strategy.
...destruction was paramount...
The wider context was unmistakable. On 16 July 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 16, outlining provisional plans for Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain.
Yet no landing could be contemplated until the Luftwaffe had secured air superiority.
The RAF’s destruction was paramount—not only to prevent it from striking the invasion fleet, but also to deny cover to the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet, which posed the greatest threat to any attempted crossing.
On 1 August, Göring received Directive No. 17, authorising an all-out assault on British air and sea power.
...the sheer resilience of Fighter Command...
Preparations for Eagle Day had begun in late July, but poor weather repeatedly delayed the start.
At last, on 13 August 1940, the assault was unleashed. Luftwaffe raids hit airfields and radar stations, inflicting damage and casualties.
Yet faulty intelligence, miscommunication, and the sheer resilience of Fighter Command blunted the impact.
The RAF was bloodied, but not broken. Its vital command and control network remained intact, and squadrons quickly regrouped.
Göring had promised Hitler swift results—days, or at most weeks.
Instead, Adlertag revealed the same misjudgements that had haunted Kanalkampf: overconfidence, flawed planning, and a failure to understand the RAF’s strength.
Eagle Day was intended as the beginning of the end for Fighter Command, but it became the prelude to the Luftwaffe’s frustration and the indefinite postponement of Operation Sea Lion.
Prelude
After Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany following the invasion of Poland in September 1939, Europe entered nine tense months of stalemate along the Western Front.
This uneasy lull - often described as the “Phoney War”—masked intense planning within the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High Command) and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces).
By October 1939, German strategists had shifted their focus westward, preparing the next decisive campaign.
British troops reading copies of the Army newspaper 'Blighty' outside their dugout, December 1939. The Phoney War (September 1939 – May 1940) was a period of uneasy calm following Britain and France’s declaration of war on Germany after the invasion of Poland. Despite mobilisations, little major fighting occurred along the Western Front. Allied forces manned the Maginot Line, while the Germans prepared for future offensives. Sporadic skirmishes, naval clashes, and propaganda duels marked the months. This lull ended abruptly with the German blitzkrieg in May 1940, shattering the illusion of stalemate.
...shattered Allied defences...
On 10 May 1940, the German offensive—Unternehmen Gelb (Operation Yellow), also known as the Manstein Plan—was unleashed.
This bold and rapid campaign shattered Allied defences.
The Battle of France ended in catastrophe for the Allies: the main French Army was destroyed, while the British Expeditionary Force narrowly escaped through Dunkirk.
Paris fell on 14 June, and within weeks German forces had swept across much of the country.
On 25 June 1940, France formally surrendered, leaving Britain standing alone against Hitler’s war machine.
French artillerymen reloading a heavy artillery piece of 155mm during the Battle of France, 1940. The Battle of France in 1940 starkly revealed the contrast between French and German forces. France relied on static defences like the Maginot Line, dispersed armour, and cautious tactics, while the Wehrmacht concentrated tanks and mobile infantry in fast, decisive thrusts. German use of blitzkrieg, supported by close air power from the Luftwaffe, overwhelmed French command structures. Despite numerical parity in men and tanks, Germany’s speed, coordination, and adaptability shattered French resistance in just six weeks.
...offering surprisingly lenient terms...
With Western Europe neutralised, the attention of both the OKL and OKW shifted across the Channel.
Hitler initially hoped Britain would seek an armistice, offering surprisingly lenient terms, but Winston Churchill’s coalition government refused all overtures.
Frustrated, Hitler issued orders for preparations for an invasion - Operation Sealion.
To make such an assault possible, air superiority had to be secured.
...promised swift victory from the skies...
The Luftwaffe was tasked with destroying the RAF, while the Kriegsmarine was ordered to prepare the transport of German forces across the Channel.
Göring promised swift victory from the skies. If the RAF could be crushed, Hitler believed invasion might not even be necessary.
This aerial offensive was codenamed Adlerangriff - Operation Eagle Attack—the campaign that would lead directly into the Battle of Britain.
The First Phase: Kanalkampf
The Luftwaffe entered the Battle of Britain already weakened by the heavy fighting of the spring campaigns.
During the conquest of France alone, over 1,400 aircraft had been lost, while earlier operations in Poland and Norway during 1939 had cost another 500 machines.
These severe losses forced the German air force into a period of rebuilding before any major assault could be directed against the Royal Air Force.
Only once its strength had returned to an acceptable level did the Luftwaffe begin the first stage of its offensive against Britain.
...sought to provoke Fighter Command...
That opening phase, known as the Kanalkampf - the Channel battle - began on 10 July and ran through to 8 August 1940.
It did not initially focus on RAF airfields deep inland, but instead sought to provoke Fighter Command into combat by attacking British Channel convoys.
The logic was straightforward: by drawing the RAF into repeated defensive battles over the Channel, the Luftwaffe hoped to wear down its pilots and aircraft before launching a decisive strike.
Yet in practice, the results were disappointing. In terms of shipping losses, only 24,000 tons were sunk, while minelaying operations proved somewhat more effective, accounting for 38,000 tons.
...bloodied but unbroken...
For Fighter Command, the cost was comparatively light.
In July, 74 fighter pilots were killed or went missing, with another 48 wounded, but the overall strength of the RAF actually increased, rising to 1,429 operational aircraft by 3 August.
Shortages remained - 124 pilots below establishment—but these were far from critical.
The Kanalkampf had failed to inflict decisive damage, and the RAF entered August bloodied but unbroken.
...all marked for destruction...
The second phase of German attacks unfolded between 8 and 18 August.
Shipping remained a target, but now coastal airfields, radar stations, and positions south of London were brought under attack, with raids also reaching as far north as Liverpool under cover of darkness.
On 12 August, the Luftwaffe mounted its first major inland strikes.
RAF stations at Hawkinge, Lympne, and Manston, along with radar stations at Pevensey, Rye, and Dover, were all marked for destruction.
Portsmouth docks were also bombed.
...would fatally undermine the larger offensive...
Yet again, the results proved uneven.
The radar station at Ventnor was badly damaged, and other sites suffered temporary disruption, but by the following morning all were back in operation.
The airfields came under attack but were not destroyed; even Lympne, not an operational station at all, was mistakenly targeted.
Such blunders in intelligence would fatally undermine the larger offensive.
...the next and most ambitious stage of the battle...
By 12 August, despite these frustrations, the Luftwaffe believed it was achieving significant results against Fighter Command.
Preparations were finalised for an all-out assault—the operation known as Adlertag, or Eagle Day. German air strength had recovered sufficiently: 71 percent of bombers, 85 percent of Bf 109 units, and 83 percent of Bf 110 units were operational.
With confidence high, the Luftwaffe prepared to launch the next and most ambitious stage of the battle.
Intelligence
Faulty intelligence would lay at the very heart of Adlertag’s eventual failure.
Although the gap between British and German intelligence was not yet overwhelming, the advantage was beginning to tilt decisively in Britain’s favour.
The breaking of the Enigma machine, combined with the Luftwaffe’s poor signals discipline, gave the British unprecedented access to German communications.
The precise impact of Ultra on the Battle of Britain remains debated—official histories long maintained there was no direct influence.
Yet, regardless of that claim, Ultra and the RAF’s Y-Service together built a far more accurate picture of German deployments and intentions than the Luftwaffe ever achieved.
...most dangerous mistakes...
General Joseph "Beppo" Schmid, head of Luftwaffe intelligence in 1940, misjudged RAF strength, underestimated British aircraft production, ignored radar’s significance, and fed Göring flawed assessments that fatally undermined Germany’s Battle of Britain strategy.
At the core of German misjudgement stood Joseph “Beppo” Schmid, commander of the Luftwaffe’s Military Intelligence Branch, Abteilung 5.
His reports throughout this period were riddled with errors.
In July 1940, Schmid both exaggerated the Luftwaffe’s own strength and underestimated the capacity of the RAF.
His most dangerous mistakes concerned radar, airfield identification, and British aircraft production.
Schmid confidently asserted that southern England possessed only a handful of operational airfields.
He claimed Britain could build merely 180–330 fighters per month and predicted that production would soon decline, leaving the RAF unable to withstand a prolonged battle of attrition.
The truth was very different: in July 1940 British factories produced 496 fighters.
...omitted vital details...
Schmid further characterised the RAF as rigid and inflexible, convinced its fighters were tied to home bases and unable to manoeuvre dynamically.
He also omitted vital details about the RAF’s highly effective maintenance and organisation system, which rapidly restored damaged aircraft to service.
Above all, Schmid anticipated only a short campaign and failed completely to mention radar—perhaps his gravest oversight.
The Luftwaffe’s neglect of sustained radar attacks left Britain’s early warning system intact. Radar continued to direct Fighter Command squadrons to intercept raids at precisely the right moments, maximising defensive efficiency.
German intelligence also consistently misidentified airfields, striking stations of RAF Bomber or Coastal Command rather than Fighter Command.
...flawed intelligence...
On Adlertag itself, many of the designated targets, even if destroyed, would have done little to weaken Britain’s fighter defence.
Thus, the Luftwaffe’s grand offensive began from a foundation built on flawed intelligence.
The errors of Schmid and his branch meant that Adlertag’s blows fell wide of the mark, allowing the RAF to fight on with undiminished strength.
RAF Fighter Command
The foundation of Britain’s defence during the Battle of Britain rested on a vast and intricate system of detection, command, and control.
This structure, known as the Dowding System after its architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, was the beating heart of RAF Fighter Command.
Dowding had taken the framework first laid down by Major General E. B. Ashmore in 1917 and transformed it into a modern, efficient, and highly coordinated network.
Central to his design was the adoption of Radio Direction Finding—radar—at his own insistence.
...remarkable speed and efficiency...
By integrating this revolutionary technology with the keen eyes of the Royal Observer Corps and a meticulous system of information processing,
Dowding created a mechanism that allowed Britain to intercept and respond to incoming German attacks with remarkable speed and efficiency.
The system’s official title - RDF, or Radio Direction Finding - was itself a deliberate act of deception, designed to conceal its true purpose from German intelligence should its existence ever be revealed.
...information flowed to the central hub...
The first warnings of incoming air raids came from the Chain Home radar stations, their towers dotted along Britain’s coastline.
These facilities could often detect Luftwaffe formations as they assembled over French and Belgian airfields, long before they crossed the Channel.
Once the German aircraft moved inland, beyond radar range, the Royal Observer Corps picked up the task of tracking them. From there, information flowed to the central hub of Fighter Command at RAF Bentley Priory.
Every new plot was assessed - was it hostile or friendly? - and the findings passed directly to the main operations room, buried deep within an underground bunker.
...streams of incoming reports...
Inside this nerve centre, teams from the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) converted streams of incoming reports into a visual picture of the battle in motion.
Using telephones, they relayed details of enemy positions, then placed colour-coded counters onto a vast map of Britain, spread across a plotting table marked with a British Modified Grid.
Magnetic rakes pushed these counters across the surface, tracking each raid’s direction, altitude, and strength.
The colour of a counter indicated how recent the information was, ensuring that commanders could instantly judge whether they were working with fresh intelligence or older, less reliable data.
...a clear, real-time picture of enemy movements...
This elegantly simple method gave the Fighter Controllers, and Dowding himself, a clear, real-time picture of enemy movements and possible targets.
From this picture, swift and effective decisions could be made. The system did not rely on radar and visual sightings alone.
Supplementing these were intercepts from the Y Service, which monitored German radio transmissions, and intelligence from Bletchley Park’s Ultra decoders, who were piecing together the Luftwaffe’s order of battle.
Combined, these sources gave Fighter Command the ability to anticipate not only where the enemy was, but often what they intended to do.
...control was exercised at a tactical level...
At the same time as the central plot at Bentley Priory, identical streams of information were transmitted to the Group headquarters, where control was exercised at a tactical level.
Each Group operated its own filter room, where data was cross-checked before being passed into their operations room, also housed within fortified underground bunkers.
Here, the map on the plotting table covered the Group’s specific area of responsibility, showing its airfields, bases, and patrol sectors.
Lines of radio and telephone links carried a constant flow of reports to and from Observer Corps posts, naval stations, anti-aircraft batteries, and the sector airfields themselves.
During Adlerangriff, the WAAF plotters and RAF controllers were the unseen backbone of Fighter Command. Plotters at Bentley Priory and group headquarters swiftly transferred radar and observer data onto plotting tables, tracking incoming raids. Controllers then directed squadrons with remarkable precision, ensuring resources were deployed efficiently. Their rapid coordination, supported by telephone and radio networks, allowed Fighter Command to react instantly to Luftwaffe movements. Without these tireless women and controllers, Britain’s air defences would have been fatally compromised.
...meet the enemy with precision timing...
At the heart of each Group’s control room stood the Duty Fighter Controller, the commander’s personal representative.
It was he who decided when and how each raid would be intercepted, deploying squadrons to meet the enemy with precision timing.
Engineers were always close at hand, ready to repair any break in communications within minutes, ensuring that the lifeblood of the system—the unbroken flow of information—was never cut.
Through this vast web of radar, observers, operators, and controllers, the Dowding System transformed scattered reports into coordinated action.
It was the invisible keystone of Britain’s defence, the quiet architecture behind every interception, and the reason Fighter Command could stand its ground against the full force of the Luftwaffe.
13 August - Adlertag
On Tuesday 13th August 1940, the Luftwaffe launched its long-promised assault on Britain. Adlertag (Eagle Day) was intended as the decisive opening strike that would cripple Fighter Command and pave the way for invasion.
Yet poor intelligence, confused orders, and British resilience turned this planned triumph into a day of costly frustration.
The day before, 12 August, had been billed as a rehearsal. Radar stations at Pevensey, Rye, Dover, and Ventnor were struck, along with airfields at Hawkinge, Lympne, and Manston. Portsmouth docks were also bombed.
Damage was limited: only Ventnor was briefly disabled, while other stations were back in service within hours.
Airfields sustained damage but remained operational, and German intelligence mistakenly identified Lympne as a major fighter base. Intended to blind and weaken the RAF, the raids instead underscored the resilience of Britain’s radar network and repair system.
Adlertag (Eagle Day) - 13th August 1940: On Adlertag, the Luftwaffe launched a massive, coordinated assault to cripple RAF air power. Striking airfields, radar stations, and infrastructure across southern England, they deployed hundreds of bombers and fighters. Poor weather, communication failures, and strong RAF resistance blunted the offensive, resulting in heavy German losses.
...were mauled by Hurricanes and Spitfires...
Adlertag itself began in confusion. Poor weather forced a postponement, but the recall orders failed to reach all units.
At dawn, Dorniers of KG 2 bombed Eastchurch unescorted, devastating hangars, stores, and aircraft—but Eastchurch was a Coastal Command base, not part of Fighter Command.
On their return, the Dorniers were mauled by Hurricanes and Spitfires, losing five aircraft.
Other early raids against Farnborough and Odiham achieved little, with German crews greatly exaggerating their success.
...inflated claims masked the limited damage inflicted...
As morning advanced, coordination faltered. Units of Luftflotte 3 attacked Portland Harbour and Bristol docks, while others bombed minor or misidentified airfields.
Communication failures left formations flying unescorted, and inflated claims masked the limited damage inflicted.
At Portland, a “freie Jagd” of Bf 110s blundered into Hurricanes, losing six aircraft in minutes.
By afternoon, Göring pressed forward. Large raids crossed the Channel aimed at RAF bases and industrial sites.
Ju 87s of StG 77 attacked Detling with devastating local effect, killing 67 personnel and destroying 22 aircraft—but again, the station belonged to Coastal Command, not Fighter Command.
At Southampton, bombs caused fires and damaged infrastructure, while Eastchurch and Rochester were struck again. RAF squadrons scrambled in strength, exacting losses from the attackers.
...a bitter blow...
While the Luftwaffe pressed its daylight offensive, RAF Bomber Command suffered disaster.
Twelve Blenheims sent against Aalborg in Denmark lost eleven aircraft, with only one returning - a bitter blow that darkened the RAF’s own tally for the day.
As night fell, German operations shifted to psychological warfare.
Nine He 111s of Kampfgruppe 100 attempted to bomb the Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich, but only four crews found the target, causing minor damage.
Other raids struck Belfast, Glasgow, and cities across Britain, destroying five Short Stirlings at Queen’s Island but achieving little else.
Propaganda leaflets, parachutes, and radios were dropped over the Midlands and Scotland to suggest an imminent invasion.
Scattered raids stretched civil defences, but physical damage was limited.
...it revealed the Luftwaffe’s shortcomings...
By day’s end, the Luftwaffe had flown almost 1,500 sorties against 727 by the RAF. German losses amounted to around 45 aircraft, compared with 15 British fighters.
Severe damage was inflicted at Detling and Eastchurch, but Fighter Command’s vital sector stations remained untouched.
German crews claimed thirty fighters destroyed, but RAF records confirmed only half that number.
Among the day’s losses was Luftwaffe ace Oberleutnant Paul Temme, while British pilots such as Adolph “Sailor” Malan led spirited defences. Adlertag had promised a crushing blow.
Instead, it revealed the Luftwaffe’s shortcomings in intelligence, communication, and coordination. Fighter Command, bloodied but intact, emerged with its defensive system unbroken.
For the Luftwaffe, Eagle Day was not the decisive victory Göring envisaged, but the beginning of a long, grinding battle Britain was prepared to fight.
14th August
On Wednesday 14 August 1940, poor visibility and heavy cloud curtailed large-scale operations, but the Luftwaffe pressed ahead with scattered raids across southern and western England.
Though less intense than Adlertag, these strikes tested Fighter Command and inflicted local damage. At 11:40 hours, radar picked up a major formation over Calais.
Around eighty Ju 87s from II./StG 1 and IV./LG 1, escorted by 100 Bf 109s, crossed the Kent coast. Hurricanes and Spitfires intercepted, losing three fighters while the Germans lost one Bf 109, its pilot captured near Dover.
...fought back fiercely...
The Stukas attacked harbour targets, sinking the Goodwin Lightship and destroying barrage balloons.
Minutes later, sixteen Bf 110s of Erprobungsgruppe 210 bombed RAF Manston, destroying hangars, cratering the runway, and wrecking aircraft on the ground.
Anti-aircraft gunners fought back fiercely, downing two of the attackers within the airfield perimeter.
Despite damage, Manston remained operational.
...achieving temporary disruption...
In the afternoon, Do 17s struck Pevensey radar station, achieving temporary disruption.
Further raids targeted Middle Wallop, hit four times between 17:07 and 19:35, killing three airmen and a civilian.
Spitfires of No. 609 Squadron intercepted, downing a Ju 88 and a He 111, the latter carrying Oberst Alois Stöckl, Kommodore of KG 55. RAF Andover also suffered, while Southampton’s rail network was disrupted.
...defences again absorbed the blows...
In the west, He 111s attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton but were intercepted by No. 92 Squadron, three bombers destroyed.
Smaller raids struck Whitchurch Airport, Weston-super-Mare, and RAF Sealand, where a He 111 was brought down by training unit pilots.
Night operations were scattered and caused little damage. Berlin itself endured an air raid alarm, though no bombs fell.
The day lacked Eagle Day’s intensity, but Britain’s defences again absorbed the blows and remained unbroken.
15th August - The Greatest Day
Thursday, 15 August 1940, marked the Luftwaffe’s most ambitious assault of the Battle of Britain.
For the first time, all three German air fleets—Luftflotten 2, 3, and 5—were thrown into a combined offensive.
Nearly 1,800 sorties were flown, more than 500 by bombers. Göring’s directive was clear: destroy the RAF in the air and on the ground, cripple its factories, silence its airfields.
The attacks inflicted damage, yet the price was heavy—seventy-six aircraft lost in a single day, including twenty-six of the prized Bf 110s. Fighter Command endured, bloodied but unbroken.
On 15 August 1940, Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 spearheaded the Luftwaffe’s main offensive in southern England. Luftflotte 2, under Kesselring, directed mass raids against Kent, Sussex, and the Thames Estuary, hammering airfields like Hawkinge, Lympne, and Biggin Hill. Simultaneously, Luftflotte 3, led by Sperrle, struck Hampshire, Wiltshire, and Dorset, with attacks on Middle Wallop, Worthy Down, and Portland. Despite heavy bombing and widespread disruption, RAF squadrons fought fiercely, inflicting punishing losses that blunted the German advance.
http://www.arborfield-september49ers.co.uk/
...an omen of the battles to come...
The day opened at 04:50 when a Dornier Do 17, sent to photograph southern airfields, was intercepted south of Ventnor by Spitfires of No. 152 Squadron.
It was shot down before completing its task—an omen of the battles to come.
At mid-morning, forty-five Ju 87 Stukas, escorted by JG 26 fighters, dived on Hawkinge and Lympne. Hurricanes of No. 501 Squadron and Spitfires of No. 54 Squadron intercepted, downing several attackers, yet the bombers pressed through.
Lympne was wrecked—buildings destroyed, power and telephone lines cut, the station unusable for forty-eight hours.
Hawkinge was hit but quickly recovered. Radar coverage briefly faltered as power lines to Rye, Dover, and Foreness stations were severed.
...defensive circles of Bf 110s were picked apart...
Around midday, Luftflotte 5 struck from Norway in its only major daylight raid of the battle.
Sixty-five He 111s and thirty-four Bf 110s advanced on northern airfields, led by Hauptmann Werner Restemeyer.
But British radar detected them early, and No. 13 Group scrambled Spitfires and Hurricanes from Acklington, Usworth, and Tyneside.
The formation broke apart under pressure. Bombs were jettisoned into the sea, while defensive circles of Bf 110s were picked apart.
Restemeyer’s aircraft exploded when its belly tank ignited, plunging into the North Sea. Eight Heinkels and six Bf 110s were destroyed—losses so severe that Luftflotte 5 abandoned daylight operations entirely.
Hawker Hurricanes (P3059 and P3208) of No. 501 Squadron take off from RAF Hawkinge on a squadron patrol, 15 August 1940. Three days later, both these aircraft would be shot down and destroyed in combat between Canterbury and Whitstable. Hawker Hurricanes formed the backbone of Fighter Command’s defence. Heavily engaged across both northern and southern England, they bore the brunt of Luftwaffe attacks. In fierce dogfights, Hurricanes intercepted bomber formations, often outnumbered yet inflicting heavy losses. From Kent to Tyneside, they disrupted raids, destroying Heinkels and Bf 110s at great cost. Though many were lost, their rugged design, firepower, and the skill of their pilots proved vital in preserving Britain’s aerial shield.
https://battleofbritain1940.com/entry/thursday-15-august-1940/
...demolishing workshops and hangars...
At 13:30, fifty Ju 88s of KG 30 bombed RAF Driffield despite interceptions by Hurricanes, Spitfires, and Defiants.
Four hangars and three buildings were destroyed, seven Whitleys lost, six RAF personnel killed. Anti-aircraft fire and fighters downed six of the bombers.
An hour later, eighty-eight Do 17s of KG 3, heavily escorted, crossed from Belgium. Despite fierce resistance, many broke through.
The Short Brothers factory at Rochester was hit hard - six Stirling bombers destroyed, production halted.
At Martlesham Heath, Bf 110s of Erprobungsgruppe 210 struck low, demolishing workshops and hangars.
A Junkers Ju 87B (L1 + EV) of 10 Staffel./Lehrgeschwader 1 lies wrecked in a garden at 78-82 Shorncliffe Crescent in Folkestone. This aircraft was on a bombing sortie over the Channel on 15 August 1940 when it was hit by AA fire and Hurricanes from No. 501 Squadron. Flying at low level, the Stuka hit high tension cables causing it to crash into houses and burn out, killing both crew members (pilot Uffz Franz-Heinrich Kraus and gunner/observer Uffz Herman Weber).
https://battleofbritain1940.com/entry/thursday-15-august-1940/
...they paid dearly...
At 17:00, Luftflotte 3 sent 250 aircraft across Hampshire and Wiltshire.
Middle Wallop was lightly hit, while Worthy Down and Portland suffered only minor damage.
Eleven RAF squadrons joined battle. Twenty-five German aircraft were destroyed against sixteen RAF fighters, including three - possibly four - 109's and 110s claimed in quick succession by Belgian pilot J. Phillipart of No. 213 Squadron.
At 18:50, Croydon endured its first heavy raid. Bf 110 fighter-bombers of Erprobungsgruppe 210, their escort peeled away, struck factories and workshops, causing over eighty casualties and wrecking training aircraft.
Yet they paid dearly—six Bf 110s and a Bf 109 were shot down by Nos. 111 and 32 Squadrons.
Belgian RAF pilot Jacques Philippart who destroyed several German aircraft on the 15th August.
Messerschmitt Bf 110 D-0/B (S9+CK), W.Nr. 3341, of 2.Staffel/Erprobungsgruppe 210, force-landed at Hawkhurst in Kent following the late-afternoon raid on Croydon airfield on 15 August 1940. The starboard rudder controls had been shot through during the action, leading pilot Oberleutnant Alfred Habisch to believe the aircraft might become uncontrollable before reaching the French coast. Choosing not to risk the lives of himself or his rear gunner/radio operator, Unteroffizier Ernst Elfner, he made the decision to put the aircraft down safely in England. Both men were taken prisoner.
https://battleofbritain1940.com/entry/thursday-15-august-1940/
...suffered its heaviest losses...
Scattered raids continued into the night, reaching as far as Liverpool and Birmingham, but with little effect.
The true battle had been fought in daylight.
By nightfall, the Luftwaffe had suffered its heaviest losses of the campaign so far.
The RAF’s southern airfields were battered but operational; radar remained intact.
In the north, Luftflotte 5’s defeat was decisive. Göring’s grand plan to crush Fighter Command in a single coordinated blow had failed.
...bloodied, but unbroken...
Major Adolf Galland later recalled:
“We saw one comrade after the other vanish from our ranks… Not a day passed without a place remaining empty at the mess table.”
The Greatest Day proved that the RAF could withstand the combined weight of the Luftwaffe. Fighter Command stood bloodied, but unbroken.
16th August
The morning air was warm and still, with haze drifting over the Channel—an ominous calm before one of the fiercest days of aerial warfare yet.
By midday, the Luftwaffe launched a series of coordinated strikes that tested Fighter Command to its breaking point. At 12:00 hours, radar picked up large formations heading for Kent.
Around 100 Dornier Do 17s of KG 2, escorted by Bf 109s from JG 51, targeted the Thames Estuary and inland airfields like Biggin Hill and Kenley. RAF squadrons scrambled to intercept.
In the chaos, Flight Lieutenant Henry Ferris collided with a Dornier - both aircraft were lost.
Squadron Leader Rodney Wilkinson’s Spitfire collided with a Bf 109 flown by Unteroffizier Ernst Buder; Buder bailed out and was captured, but Wilkinson was killed.
...skies over Kent erupted...
The skies over Kent erupted as RAF fighters clashed with bombers and their escorts. Ten German aircraft were downed, but six RAF fighters were lost. Hauptmann Walter Oesau of JG 51 claimed two Spitfires, raising his tally to eighteen.
On the ground, West Malling was bombed again, forcing its closure until 20 August.
Civilian casualties mounted: Tilbury docks were hit, and at Northfleet, Bowater’s Paper Mills suffered a direct strike—25 killed, 32 injured.
At 13:00, a new wave crossed from Cherbourg—150 aircraft including Ju 87 Stukas of StG 2, Ju 88s of KG 54, and heavy fighter escort.
Over Nab Tower, the formation split: Ventnor radar, Portsmouth, Gosport, and Tangmere were all targeted.
RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires engaged fiercely. Though RAF pilots claimed 17 Stukas, Luftwaffe records confirmed nine losses.
...he survived and was awarded the Victoria Cross...
Tangmere was devastated. Dive-bombers destroyed aircraft and infrastructure; twelve personnel were killed.
Pilot Officer Billy Fiske of No. 601 Squadron, an American volunteer, crash-landed his burning Hurricane and was pulled from the wreckage.
He died the next day, becoming the first American combat fatality in RAF service.
At 13:10, Ju 88s struck Tangmere again with precision, destroying more aircraft and buildings.
Second Lieutenant E.P. Griffin of the Royal Engineers downed a Bf 110 with a Lewis gun. Gosport and Lee-on-Solent were also bombed—dozens of aircraft wrecked, 21 killed.
Ventnor radar was hit once more, silencing it until late September.
At 13:45, Flight Lieutenant James Nicholson of No. 249 Squadron was wounded and his cockpit ablaze, yet he pressed home an attack before bailing out.
Mistakenly shot by a Home Guard volunteer while descending, he survived and was awarded the Victoria Cross—the only Fighter Command pilot to receive it during the war.
Billy Fiske was a former Olympic bobsled champion and financier who joined the RAF as a volunteer before the U.S. entered the war. Flying Hurricanes with No. 601 Squadron, he was mortally wounded during a raid on Tangmere on 16 August 1940. He became the first American combat fatality of the Battle of Britain.
https://masonandsons.com/blogs/the-periodical/billy-fiske-the-american-who-died-for-england
...Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few...
Evening raids continued. Heinkels struck Heathrow, Wimbledon, Essex, and Eastbourne. Farnborough and Harwell were bombed, and Brize Norton was hit again.
Manston was dive-bombed. By nightfall, scattered attacks reached Brough, Filton, Cardiff, and South Wales.
Fighter Command lost 23 aircraft and nine pilots.
The Luftwaffe lost 44 aircraft and 55 aircrew.
Churchill, observing from RAF Uxbridge, later immortalised the day with his words: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”
17th August
After five days of relentless combat, the skies over southern England fell quiet on 17 August. Fighter Command remained on high alert, but radar screens stayed still.
Squadron Leader Mike Crossley of No. 32 Squadron called it “an amazing, heavenly day”—free from alerts, scrambles, and dogfights. The lull was genuine.
German bomber units, especially KG 3, were exhausted.
Morale was fraying.
Oberfeldwebel Manfred Langer recalled the futility of repeated missions with high losses and little impact: “Man is not a machine, though our commanders thought differently.”
...redeployed to strengthen southern defences...
Fighter Command used the pause to regroup. Repairs resumed at Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, and Kenley.
Reinforcements arrived: No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron at Duxford, No. 1 (Canadian) Squadron joined the fight, and others redeployed to strengthen southern defences.
Luftwaffe activity was limited to scattered reconnaissance. Aircraft shadowed convoys along the East Coast and probed southern airfields.
A lone German plane dropped propaganda leaflets over Welshpool.
Another was downed by the Royal Navy in the Channel.
Despite claims by Luftwaffe aces—including Oesau, Tietzen, and Bär—RAF records show no fighter losses.
...offered no true reprieve...
Nightfall brought renewed action. Small formations crossed the Thames Estuary and Norfolk coast. Between 23:00 and 03:00, bombers struck Birmingham, Coventry, Liverpool, and Avonmouth.
A Ju 88 was intercepted and destroyed off Spurn Head by No. 29 Squadron. X-Gerät-guided raids targeted Castle Bromwich, but most bombs missed.
One Heinkel crashed at Dinard; its crew survived.
Though quieter than previous days, 17 August offered no true reprieve. Both sides regrouped, recalibrated, and prepared for the next wave.
The RAF repaired and reinforced.
The Luftwaffe, strained and frustrated, began to feel the limits of its campaign.
18th August
On Sunday, August 18, 1940, the skies over southern England erupted in a maelstrom of violence, a day that would become known as "The Hardest Day" of the Battle of Britain.
The title was earned not from a single, epic dogfight, but from the brutal intensity of the Luftwaffe's operations and the staggering losses on both sides.
Driven by Reichsmarschall Göring’s directive, Luftflotten 2 and 3 launched a massive, coordinated assault aimed at crippling RAF Fighter Command's airfields and clearing the way for a cross-Channel invasion.
Over 850 sorties were flown, targeting critical airfields and radar stations, yet by nightfall, not a single sector station had been knocked out.
The cost to the Luftwaffe was immense: 67 aircraft destroyed and 97 airmen killed or captured.
...a systematic effort to test British defences...
The first blood of the day was drawn in the pre-dawn hours.
A German Junkers Ju 88 from NJG 1 was intercepted and shot down by a British Bristol Blenheim night fighter, its three crewmen becoming the first casualties of a day destined for carnage.
As daylight broke, German reconnaissance intensified.
A Messerschmitt Bf 110 was shot down at an altitude of 31,000 feet by Spitfires from No. 66 Squadron, the first daylight loss for the Luftwaffe that day and the highest recorded interception of the campaign.
These probing flights, operating from 20,000 to 25,000 feet, were a systematic effort to test British defences and pinpoint targets for the day's main assaults, which were already forming up on airfields across northern France.
...most ferocious assault...
The most ferocious assault was directed at RAF Kenley, a vital sector airfield.
The Luftwaffe’s plan was a complex, three-phase strike by Kampfgeschwader 76 (KG 76), involving dive-bombers, medium-level bombers, and a daring low-level surprise attack.
However, war rarely goes to plan.
Thick cloud over France delayed the main formations, and Hauptmann Joachim Roth’s low-level group of nine Do 17s, unaware of the delays, arrived first and alone.
...a hail of fire...
As Roth’s Dorniers swept in at treetop level, they were met by a hail of fire from No. 111 Squadron’s Hurricanes and ground defences.
Though they pressed home their attack, destroying three hangars and several aircraft on the ground, the cost was severe.
Five of the nine bombers were lost, and only one returned undamaged.
The attack claimed the life of Flight Lieutenant S.D.P. Connors of No. 111 Squadron, whose Hurricane was hit by anti-aircraft fire.
...a daring head-on attack that shattered the German formation...
Ten minutes later, the main bomber formations arrived, flying into skies already thick with smoke and flak.
They were immediately engaged by squadrons like No. 32 and No. 64. Squadron Leader Michael Crossley of No. 32 Squadron led a daring head-on attack that shattered the German formation.
The Luftwaffe’s escort fighters were also caught in a melee, and while they inflicted losses on the RAF, they also took heavy casualties.
The final German bomber wave, a group of Ju 88s, found the airfield so obscured by smoke that they diverted to RAF West Malling.
Despite the damage, Kenley’s operations room remained intact and flying operations resumed later the same day.
...particularly heavy casualties...
At 14:00, the Luftwaffe launched its most ambitious attack of the day, targeting coastal airfields and the Poling radar station.
The assault was led by over 100 vulnerable Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers.
They struck RAF Ford, RAF Thorney Island, and RNAS Gosport, inflicting significant damage to facilities and aircraft on the ground, with particularly heavy casualties at Ford.
Simultaneously, a group of Stukas attacked the Poling radar station, destroying two transmission pylons and knocking the site out of commission.
The Stukas’ lack of close fighter escort made them easy targets for the RAF.
Hurricanes from Nos. 43 and 601 Squadrons tore into the formations, shooting down ten of the 28 bombers from one group alone.
This brutal toll exposed the Ju 87’s vulnerability, and August 18, 1940, marked its last major appearance in a daylight raid over Britain.
...a fierce dogfight broke out...
As the day waned, the Luftwaffe mounted its final major assault, targeting North Weald and Hornchurch with a force of 250 aircraft.
The Heinkel bombers headed for North Weald but were forced to turn back due to low cloud cover.
Their retreat was met by a determined RAF response, which inflicted further losses.
Over Hornchurch, a fierce dogfight broke out between RAF Hurricanes and German Bf 109s, with both sides taking heavy casualties, including the death of Horst Tietzen, a 20-victory German ace.
...marked a turning point...
Sunday, August 18, 1940, was the costliest day of the campaign for the Luftwaffe.
They failed to put any RAF sector station out of action, a clear sign of Fighter Command’s resilience.
The day marked a turning point, exposing the Ju 87’s weakness and the limits of the Luftwaffe’s ability to coordinate large, multi-phase assaults.
Fighter Command had endured its hardest day, taking a brutal pounding but remaining in the fight.
30th August
The War Weekly' newspaper, dated 30 August 1940, described this period of the fighting as "savage and intense", with images of downed Luftwaffe aircraft featured in their publication.